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BY REASON THEREOF: CAUSATION AND ELIGIBILITY
UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION ACT

I. INTRODUCTION
As an adolescent, A.D. suffered from both Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD") and a speech impediment. 1
By the time he entered the seventh grade, A.D . began
exhibiting various behavioral problems that eventually led to
his placement in the "At Risk" program at his junior high
school. 2 The following year, A.D. continued to struggle with
behavioral problems at school as he faced traumatic difficulties
at home, including the death of his baby brother and increased
tensions between himself and his stepfather. 3 During this time,
A.D. also began abusing alcohol. 4 Ultimately, the school
suspended A.D. for ten days as a result of his increasingly poor
behavior and, in particular, an incident in which A.D. robbed a
school-sponsored concession stand. 5 Although A.D.'s mother
requested special education services for her son on the basis of
his ADHD, 6 A.D. was ultimately deemed ineligible for special
education by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit because the court concluded that A.D.'s need for
services was not caused by his ADHD. 7 This comment explores
L Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. A.D. ex rei. Patricia F. , 503 F .:3d :n s, :379-80 (5th
Cir. 2007) (A.D. received special education s ervices on the basis of his speech
impediment and his ADHD until he co mpleted the third grade, at which time his
mother and th e school di strict agreed th at h e no longer required such services).
2. !d. at :l80. The Fifth Circuit did not discus s A.D.' s behavioral probl e ms in
much detail. However, the di strict court's opinion described a pattern of behavior that
included "hitting another student's arm , throwing spitballs, throwing pencils, using
obscen e language, dress code violations, verual confrontations, and various other
disrespectful and disruptive beha viors." Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. A.D. ex rei. P a tricia
F .. 2006 WL 28805 1:3, *3 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
:3. Aluin, 50:1 F . ad at :380.
4. ld.
5. !d.
6. l d .
7. ld. at :184.
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the issue posed in cases like A.D.'s, in which children with
qualifying disabilities are denied special education services
because a court or other hearing authority determines that
their needs for such services are not caused by the disabilities
themselves .
Special education law is primarily governed by the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"),x which
provides federal funds to state and local education agencies
that provide a "free appropriate public education" to students
with disabilities. 9 While the IDEA requires a causal link
between a qualifying disability and the need for special
education services, 10 neither the IDEA itself, nor the federal
regulations that implement it, provide guidance on how to
interpret this requirement. 11 This comment demonstrates how
courts and other hearing authorities may utilize principles of
statutory construction and notions of causation derived from
tort law in order to confront problems of mixed causation in
IDEA eligibility cases in a way that better adheres to the
legislative purposes of the IDEA.
Part II of this comment provides background on the IDEA,
its history and purpose, and how it defines "a child with a
disability." Part II also provides a brief overview of how
eligibility determinations are made under the IDEA and the
services available to those students who are deemed eligible.
Part III provides a more in-depth look at the problem presented
in A.D.'s case and other similar cases, and explores different
ways courts interpret the IDEA's eligibility provisions when
faced with problems of mixed causation. Part III also describes
the difficulties inherent in determining the causes of
behavioral and academic problems for many students with
certain types of disabilities, as well as the consequences that
may result when students with certain disabilities fail to
receive the services they need. Part IV then uses principles of
statutory construction and causation theory derived from tort
law to explain how the causation requirement in the IDEA

8. 20 U.S.C . §§1400-1415 (2008). While § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. §794 (2008), is also relevant to special education law, it is outside the scope of
this comment.
9. 20 U.S.C. §J412(a)(l)(A).
10. See 20 U.S.C. §1401(3)(A) (the IDEA confers eligibility on those students who
have a qualifying disability and who "by reason thereof' need special education).
11. See 34 C. F.R. §§:300.1 - 300.818 (2008).
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eligibility provisions should be interpreted by courts and other
hearing authorities in order to apply the IDEA in accordance
with its legislative purpose.

II. BACKGROUND: THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION ACT

A. History and Purpose
Prior to 1975, the future looked bleak for many individuals
with disabilities. 12 Hundreds of thousands of disabled persons
were housed in state institutions, where they often failed to
receive educational or rehabilitative services. 13 Moreover, a
lack of resources at many public schools and a widespread
failure to diagnose and to understand certain types of
disabilities forced many disabled students to venture outside
the public education system in search of appropriate
educational services. 14 In order to address these problems,
Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act in 1975. 15 While the Act successfully improved educational
opportunities and results for students with disabilities, its
implementation was sometimes hampered by inefficient
methodologies and low expectations regarding the academic
potential of disabled children. 16
In 1990, the Act was amended and renamed the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act. 17 Congress expanded the class
of protected persons "in recognition of the changing dynamics
of special education ... ." 18 These amendments also expanded
12. See Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services , U.S. Office of
Special Education Programs, HISTORY: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PROGHESS IN
EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES THROUGH IDEA 2 (2000), available at
http://www.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/
history.pdf.
13. !d. at 2-3.
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2008).
15. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§14001415 (1975)). See Moira O'Neill, Delinquent or Disabled? Harmonizing the IDEA
Definition of "Emotional Disturbance" with the Educational Needs of Incarcerated
Youth, 57 HASTINGS L.J . 1189, 1200 (2006).
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(3)-(4) (2008).
17. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476,
§901, 104 Stat. 1141, 1142 (1990).
18. Wendy F. Hensel, Sharing the Short Bus: Eligibility and Identity Under the
IDEA. 58 HASTI NGS L.J. 1147, 1156 (2007).
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the services available under the IDEA and, in particular, added
a requirement that transition services be provided to help
disabled students depart from the public education system and
enter their adult lives. 19 Then, in 2004, Congress reauthorized
the IDEA 20 in an attempt to incorporate it more fully into
President Bush's No Child Left Behind philosophy. 21
In reauthorizing the IDEA, Congress stated in its findings
that "[i]mproving educational results for children with
disabilities is an essential element of our national policy of
ensuring equality of opportunity, full
participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for
individuals with disabilities." 22 Furthermore, Congress
identified protecting the rights of all disabled children and
their parents, 23 as well as providing all disabled children an
education designed to meet their unique needs, as purposes of
the reauthorized IDEA. 24 Unfortunately, current interpretation
of the causal link required by the IDEA's eligibility provision
has caused the IDEA to fall out of line with these purposes.

B. Defining a "Child with a Disability"
In order to be eligible for special education and related
services, a student must be a "child with a disability." 25 The
IDEA defines a "child with a disability" as a child having
"mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness),
speech or language impairments, visual impairments
(including blindness), serious emotional disturbance ...
orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other
health impairments, or specific learning disabilities . . . and
who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related
services." 26 Although these provisions may appear easy to
19. Cynthia L. Kelly. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act - The Hight
'IDEA' for All Children's Education, 75 J . .KAN. B.A. 24, 25 (2006).
20. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1415 (2008).
21. Nicholas L. Townsend, Framing a Ceiling As a Floor: The Changing
Definition of Learning Disabilities and the Conflicting Trends in Legislation Affecting
Learning Disabled Students , 40 CHEIGHTON L. REV. 229, 255-56 (2007). The No Child
Left Behind philosophy emphasizes equality of educational opportunity with res ults
measured by performa nce on state academic proficiency assessme nts. See, 20 U .S.C.
§6:301 (2008).
2Z. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(l)
2il. 20 U.S.C. §1400(d)(l)(B).
24. 20 U.S.C. §1400(d)(l)(A).
2 5. 20 U.S.C. §1414(a)(l)(B).
26. 20 U.S.C. §1401 (2008) (emphasis added). Each of the quali(ying disabilities is
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interpret, they pose significant challenges for courts and other
authorities charged with determining eligibility for special
education and related services because of the lack of clear
guidance in the IDEA with respect to many of the key terms
used in these provisions and in the federal regulations that
implement them. 27 Although several of these challenges have
been explored in commentary,28 the causal link required by the
"by reason thereof' language has been left untouched by
commentators.
One possible explanation for the lack of discussion
surrounding the "by reason thereof' requirement may be the
belief that the requirement of causation has been incorporated
into another eligibility requirement of the IDEA. 29 The IDEAimplementing federal regulations require in the definition of
each of the enumerated disabilities that the student's
particular disability "adversely affect" the student's academic
performance_:lO For example, although "speech impairment" is
listed in the federal regulations, a student's speech impairment
must "adversely affect [the student's] educational performance"
in order for it to rise to the level of a qualifying disability. 31
Once a hearing officer determines that a student's speech
impairment "adversely affects" his academic performance, it
may seem obvious to that officer that the student needs special
education services "by reason of' that speech impairment.
While it may appear that these two requirements are asking
the same question, they are the subjects of very different
debates over interpretation. With respect to the requirement
that a disability "adversely affect" a student's "educational
performance," controversies have formed over how broadly the
term "educational performance" should be construed and over

enumera ted and furth er defined in the IDEA-imple menting federa l regulations. See :-14
C.P .R. §:300.8(c)(l)- (1 :-l) (2008).
27. Hobert A. Garda, Jr. , Who i:; Eliuible Under the Ind ividuals with Disabilities
Education Imp rove ment Act (, :35 .J.L. & ElllJ C. 291, 292 (2006) ("These apparently
s imp le provisions a re in fact a mong the most comple x requirem en ts of IDEA.").
28. Id.; Hobe rt A. Garda Jr., Untangling Eliuibility Requirements Under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 69 Mo. L. REV . 44 1 (2004); Hensel , supra
not!' l il.
29. S ec Garda, supra note 27, at 294 (noting th a t. beca use the IDEAimpl e me nting federal regulations require the disability to adversel y affect t he stude nt's
edu cational performance in order for eligibility to attach, "most courts and hearing
offi cer s id entify only a two -par t tes t for IDEA eligibility").
:30. S ee :i4 C. F.R. §:300.8(c)(l)-(13) (2008).
:i l. 34 C.F.R. §:300.8(c)(ll).
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how "adverse" the effects of a student's disability must be on
that performance. 32 Although the "by reason thereof'
requirement has not yet been fully explored, courts struggle to
define the term "need" as it is used in that subsection of the
IDEA eligibility provisions as a separate requirement from the
"adversely affects" requirement. 33 Moreover, it is important to
recognize that these requirements are actually two separate
elements of IDEA eligibility, both as a matter of statutory
construction 34 and as a matter of judicial precedent. 35
Therefore, in order to be considered eligible for special
education services, a student must (1) have an enumerated
disability, (2) that adversely affects his educational
performance, and (3) by reason thereof, need special education
services.
Further complicating the issue of causation in many IDEA
eligibility cases is the fact that many of the definitions of
qualifying disabilities incorporate additional elements of
causation beyond the "adversely affects" requirement. For
example, a student with autism will not be classified as autistic
under the IDEA-implementing federal regulations if that
student's academic performance is adversely affected primarily
because of an "emotional disturbance." 36 The definition of
"emotional disturbance," in turn, specifically excludes from
eligibility those students whose problems are caused by "social
maladjustment," a term that is not defined in either the federal
regulations or by experts in the field. 37 Similarly, the definition
of "specific learning disability" excludes students whose

32. See ~tenerally, Garda, supra note 27 , at 295-306 (identifying a number of
disagreements among co urts with respect to those terms).
::a. /d. at 806- 815.
34. See infra. notes 107- 110 and accompanying text (explaining that, as a matter
of sta tutory construction, the words "by reason thereof' must be given their due effect
as the words chosen by the legislature in crafting the IDEA).
35. See Mr. I. ex rel. L.I. v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 5!), 480 F. 3d 1, 1:~ (l s t
Cir. 2007) (distinguishing the "adve rsel y affects" requin!me nt from the "by reason
thereof' requiwm ent) (citing Ma rk C. Weber, Special Education Law and Litigation
Treatise~ 2.2(1) at 2:4 (2d ed. 2002); Garda, supra note 28, at 490-91) .
:i6. 84 C.F.R. §:300.8(c)(1)(ii) (2008).
:37. 34 C. F.H. §a00.8(c)(4)(ii) (2008) S1~e. e.g, Ke nneth W. Me rrell a nd Hill M.
Walker, IJeco nstructin{? a Definition: Social Maladjustment Versus Emotional
Disturbance and Moving the EBD Field Forward, 41(8) PSYCHOL. Sell. 899, 901 (2004).
("[T]hc description of this construct ha s been left to individu als and organizations
within the fie ld, as well as to the state a nd local education agencies responsible for
imple me nting special education services . .. However, there ha s never been a single
description of [social ma ladjustment] that has been universally recognized."). ld.
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learning problems are caused by "environmental, cultural, or
economic disadvantage[s]." 38
These definitions, while making the determination of
causation and eligibility even more complicated for courts, can
also provide another means-beyond incorporation of causation
into the "adversely affects" requirement-for some authorities
to deny eligibility on causation grounds without directly
referencing the "by reason thereof' requirement. For example,
the exclusion of "social maladju stment" from the definition of
"emotional disturbance" in the federal regulations may allow
authorities to exclude from eligibility those students whose
behavioral problems may at least partially stem from external
contributing factors (i.e., drug u se, sexual abuse, or problems at
home). One such case involved a young man identified as
M.C. 39
When M.C. was in the seventh grade, a male cousin began
sexually abusing him. 40 The abuse escalated over the next two
years, despite a protective order against the cousin. 41 When he
was in the ninth grade, M.C. was diagnosed with ADHD. 42
During the 2002-2003 school year, when M.C. was in the tenth
grade, he was suspended three times: once for fighting, once for
assaulting a fellow student, and once for marijuana
possession.4 ] Amid this flurry of suspensions, M.C.'s parents
requested special education services for their son from the
school district's Committee on Special Education ("CSE"). 44 In
May 2003 , the CSE determined that M.C. was not eligible for
special education services under the IDEA because he failed to
meet the criteria for classification as emotionally disturbed. 45
A second CSE meeting in July of that year affirmed the
determination of ineligibility. 46 Although the second CSE
meeting was the first time the evidence of M.C.'s past sexual
abuse was brought to light, 4 7 "[t]he CSE believed that it was
aH. :~4 C.F.R ~:l00 .8(c ) ( lO)( ii) (200H).
39. N.C. ex rei. M.C. v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Di st., 4n F. Supp. 2d 5:12 (S. D.N.Y.
2007).
40. Id. nt 5cl5.
41. !d.
42. ld. at 5:3fi.
43. l d.
44. ld.
45. M.C., 47:l F. Supp. 2d at 5:l7 .
46. ld. at fi3H .
47. ld. at fi:37.
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M.C.'s drug use that caused his deterioration , rather than the
sexual abuse." 48 This view was echoed by the Independent
Hearing Officer ("IHO") in February 2004. 49 For M.C., this
distinction, with respect to causation, meant the difference
between eligibility via classification as "emotionally disturbed"
and exclusion via classification as "socially maladjusted." 50
When the case finally reached the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, the district court
continued to cite drug abuse as the cause of M.C.'s problems at
school. 51 While the court conceded that there was
"disagreement among the various professionals who treated
M.C. about the extent of his psychological problems and the
role that his drug use played in his state of mind," 52 the court
nonetheless concluded that M.C. was not eligible for services
under the IDEA. 53 M.C.'s case demonstrates one more way
courts currently confront the complexity of causation issues in
IDEA eligibility cases, even without explicit reference to the
"by reason thereof' provision.

C. Making Eligibility Determinations 54
The road to accessing special education services begins with
an evaluation of the student. 55 A written request for an
evaluation of the student may be made by the student's
parent(s) or by a state or local education agency. 56 During the
evaluation, the educational agency employs a variety of
methodologies in an effort to determine whether the student is
suffering from a qualifying disability and, if so, the educational

48. lei. at 538-:19.
49. !d. at 5:-19. ("In sum . IHO Kandil akis agreed with th e ana lysi s that drug use ,
and not. sex ual abuse, wa s t he reason for M. C.'s 'downward spiral ' a nd tha t a
classific ation as e motionally di s turbed wa s inappropriate and unnecessary.") .
50. lei. at 545.
51. M.C., 47:3 F. Supp . 2d at 54cl.
[>2. !d. at 545.
f):-l. !d. at fi47.
54. i\n in-depth examinati on of the process of requesting and receiving special
education services under the IDEA is outside the scope of thi s co mment. 'l'hmefore, this
section will merely attempt to provide a brief overview of th e process by highligh t ing
those features most relevant to the comment's di sc ussion of eli gibility determinations
in cases of mixed ca usation. S ee 20 U.S. C. §1414 (2008) (detailing the e valuation and
eligibility process): :H C.F.R. 800. fi02 (2008) (describing procedural safeguards).
5~>. 20 U.S.C. §1414(a)(l)(A) (2008).
56. 20 U.S. C. § 1414(a)(l)(B)
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needs of the student. 57 Once the evaluation is complete, a
determination of eligibility is made .58 If the party seeking
special education services disagrees with the outcome of the
evaluation, he or she may request an Independent Educational
Evalua tion ("lEE"). 59 If such a request is made, the school or
agency must respond either by paying for a new evaluation by
an independent examiner or by showing at a due process
hearing that the initial evaluation of the student reached the
appropria te result. 60
Ultimately, after exhausting the administrative remedies
provided for in the IDEA, either party may file a civil action in
federal district court. 61 Because feder al courts lack expertise
regarding the educational needs of children with disabilities,
they r ely on the fact -finding done by state and local education
agencies during the administrative portion of the process. 62 In
fact, these agencies are often given significant deference by the
courts. 63 However, both the administrative proceedings and the
federal court proceedings in IDEA eligibility cases ca n easily
collapse into contests of dueling experts due to the difficulties
inherent in determining the causes of many types of
disabilit ies. 64 Nevertheless, some hearing authorities appear to
be ca pable of reaching nuanced conclusions with respect to
causation in IDEA eligibility cases. 65

D. Special Education Services
According to the IDEA, special education consists of
fi7. 20 U.S.C. § 14 14(h)(2)(A)
r,s. 20 U.S. C. §l414(b)(4).
5D. .'34 C. F.R. s:300.fi02(b)(l) (2008) .
fiO. :34 C.F.R. §:l00.502(b) .
Gl. 20 U.S.C. § ! 4 15 (i)(2)(A) (2008).
fi2. See , e.g., Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch . Athleti c Ass'n, il7::l F.2d 933, 9:35
(fit.h Cir. 1989) (staling that. t hi s reliance on administrative fact-finding is necessary in
orde r to fulfill th<• purposes of the IDEA) (citing Smith v. Robinson , 468 U.S. 992, 1012
( 1984)).
6:3. S ee, e.g., Hd. of Ed uc. of Montgomery County, Md. v. S.G., 230 Fed. Appx. :330,
:3:1 1 (4th Cir. 200 7) ; P.H. v. Woodmore Local Sch. Dist., 2fiG Fed. Appx. 75 1, 753; P.R. &
B.R. ex ref. C.R v. Woodmore Local Sch . Dist., 2007 WL 4163857, *3 (6th Cir. 2007)
(stati n g t h at "[m[ ore weight is due to an agency's determination on matters f(H' which
cdueational < ~ xpcr tis<' is relevant" (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Fayette, Ky. v . L.M ., 478
F.:kl :307, :n:i (6t h Cir. 20(J7))); RB. ex rei. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist. , 496
F . :~ d 9:J2, 9:l7 (9th Cir. 2007) (accordin g due defe rence to the careful a nd thorough
f indings of t h e a dministrative agency).
64. S ee infra Part III.R
65. S ee infra note s B0-91 a nd accompany in g text.
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"specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to m eet
the unique needs of a child with a disability." 66 The primary
mechanism for delivery of these services is the Individualized
Education Program ("IEP"). 67 An IEP is defined in the IDEA as
a written statement for each student with a disability that
includes the student's present level of performance, annual
goals to be m et by the student, and a statement of the special
education services to be provided to that student so that h e or
she may achieve those goals. 68 Courts, however, disagree as to
the amount of modification necessa ry to transform general
education into special education. 69
Differing interpretations of what qualifies as "special
education" play a role in IDEA eligibility determinations. For
example, the Eighth Circuit has adopted the view that any
modification to the general education constitutes "special
education" for purposes of the IDEA. 70 Therefore, an authority
applying the Eighth Circuit's approach would find a student
eligible for special education services if the student could show
that by reason of his qualifying disability he needed even a
slight modification to the general education curriculum. On the
other hand, the California State Educational Agency has h eld
that a student who required a variety of modifications to the
general education program was ineligible under the IDEA
because the modifications did not constitute "special
education," so long as they were "services offered within the
regular instructional program."7 1

III. THE PROBLEM
A Confronting the Problem of Mixed Causation

In A.D.'s case, t he United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit emphasized the requirement of a causal link
between a qualifying disability and the n eed for special
education services in determining that A.D. was not eligible for

66.
67.
68.
G9.
70.
71.

20 U.S. C. § 1401 (29) (2008) .
See, e.g , Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, ~11 (1988).
20 U.S.C. §1414(d) (2008)
Garda , sup ra n ote 27 at 320-21.
Yankton Sch . Dist . v. Schramm, 93 F .:3d 1:169, 1:174 (8th Cir. 1996) .
Mountain Empire Unifi ed Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR 29 (Cal. SEA 2001).

1]

CAUSATION AND ELIGIBILITY UNDER THE IDEA 183

special education under the IDEA. 72 In May 2005 , A.D.'s
mother requested special education services for her son as well
as a due process hearing with an independent hearing officer.7 3
Six months later, the hearing officer concluded tha t A.D.
qualified under the IDEA as a "child with a disability," and was
therefore entitled to special education services.74
The school district appealed the hearing officer's decision to
a federal district court that concluded that "A. D. did not need
special education services by reason of his ADHD," and was
therefore ineligible for those services. 75 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that A.D. was
not eligible for special education. 76 The court agreed with the
school district's argument that "much of A.D.'s behavioral
problems derived from non-ADHD related occurrences, such as
alcohol abuse and the tragic death of A.D.'s brother. Thus ...
any educational need is not by reason of A.D.'s ADHD .... "77
Despite the emphasis placed on the "by reason thereof'
requirement in A.D.'s case, the requirement has been
overlooked by other authorities. 711 For example, in determining
whether a student with Attention Deficit Disorder ("ADD") was
entitled to special education services, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania framed
the issue as follows: "Acknowledging that ADD is a specifically
named disability in the fed eral regulations, the District
concedes that the remaining issue related to IDEA is whether
or not [the student] needs special education." 79 In this instance,
framing the issue so narrowly reduces the IDEA eligibility
inquiry to a two-factor test that does not require a causal link
between the two factors.
When this approach is contrasted with the approach taken
by the Fifth Circuit in A.D.'s case, the inequity becomes clear.
72. Alvin, 50:3 F.:3d at :384.
73. !d . a t :lt;O.
74. !d. at :l81.
7G. l d . (emphasis added) (th is conclus ion appears t.o imply that although th e
di strict court. believed that A.D. n eeded services, it did not believe that hi s need was
caused by his ADHD. The court, however, did not make this point clea r).
76. !d. at 3S4 .
77. !d. (emphasis added) (In reaching this con clusion , the Fifth Circuit did not
clarify how much of a rol e, if any , it beli eved ADHD had played in A.D.'s behaviora l
problems.).
78. See Garda, supra note 29 at 294.
79. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Bruce C. , 194 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (E.D.Pa.
2002).
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A party seeking special education services from an authority in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania would need only show
that the student (1) suffers from a qualifying disability and (2)
needs special education services. 80 On the other hand, the Fifth
Circuit approach requires proof of a third element: the party
requesting services must show that the need for special
education services has been caused by the disability and not by
other factors such as drug abuse, sexual abuse, or family
trauma. 81
The Ninth Circuit has noted, on at least one occasion, that
the problem posed by cases like A.D.'s has already been
resolved by the IDEA-implementing federal regulations. 82 In
Capistrano Unified School District v. Wartenberg, the student
at issue, Jeremy, had been diagnosed with ADD and a conduct
disorder. 83 Jeremy began receiving special education services
in the second grade, however, those services were provided to
address an unrelated diagnosis of a visual/motor impairment. 84
As Jeremy got older, his behavior and academic
performance worsened,
and he
became
increasingly
85
aggressive. Jeremy's physicians indicated that there were
"both behavioral and neurochemical contributors" to his
distractibility and impulsiveness, and that he required a highly
structured learning environment. 86 An IEP was developed for
Jeremy based on this information; however, Jeremy continued
to fail the majority of his classes. 87 When the school responded
by offering Jeremy a new IEP that actually decreased the
services provided to him, his parents filed for a due process
hearing. 88
At the hearing, the school's expert psychologist disagreed
with the previous diagnoses, and stated that he believed
Jeremy's problems at school were the result of willful
misbehavior. 89 The hearing officer, taking the expert testimony
into consideration, determined that Jeremy's poor academic
t\0 . ld.

81.
S2.
S:l.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Alvin. 50::3 F.:3d at :384.
Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 1995).
Jd. at 886.
!d.
ld.
ld.
!d. at 887.
Capistrano, 59 F.:1d at 887.
ld. at 887-8B.
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performance was caused by his ADD , not willful misbehavior,
but that "the two causes could not be separated out."90 The
hearing officer found that "[s]ome of ,Jeremy's misbehavior
might be due to his conduct disorder, rather than his specific
learning disability, but his deficit in attention was a
substantial cause of his behavioral problems, and J eremy's
social and emotional problems could not be separated out from
the symptoms associated with his specific learning disability." 91
Therefore, the hearing officer concluded that the plan offered
by the school district was inappropriate. 92 The district court
affirmed this conclusion.93
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that in
cases where a student's academic problems are caused by both
a qualifying disability and outside factors such as willful
misconduct, the IDEA-implementing federal regulations
require that the student be classified as having a "specific
learning disability." 94 However, that reading of the definition of
"specific learning disability" has not been followed by other
circuits who have dealt with this problem of mixed causation.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning does not appear to be
supported by the federal regulations, upon which the court
claimed to be relying. 9 5
These differing approaches, combined with the intricate
web of causation requirements found both in the IDEA and the
federal regulations, demonstrate the difficulty courts have had
in interpreting the causal link required by the "by reason
thereof' language. The courts struggle most in cases where the
relationship between the student's need for services and his
disability is not immediately apparent, or has been clouded by
outside contributing factors like drug and/or alcohol abuse,
past sexual abuse, or other problems at home .

B. What Causes a Student's Behavioral and Academic
Problems?
Students with emotional disabilities, learning disabilities,
and other health impairments (like ADHD) are the most likely
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Jd. at 888-89.
ld. at 889.
!d.
ld. a t 890.
Capistrano, 59 F.~~d at 89:3-94.
;34 C.F.R. §:J00 .8(c)( 10) (2008).
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to be affected by the problem of dueling experts in IDEA
eligibility cases because those particular disabilities, and the
causes behind them, are the least readily observable and the
least understood. 96 Modern psychology and psychiatry have yet
to devise a method for pinpointing the exact cause of behavioral
and
learning
disabilities. 97
Throughout
the
IDEA
reauthorization process, members of Congress expressed
concerns that the category of "specific learning disabilities" was
too broad and amorphous to be properly understood and
applied. 98 Based on the inability of experts to fully understand
certain types of disabilities, it seems unreasonable for courts to
attempt to reduce the IDEA eligibility inquiry into a search for
a single cause, or to require that the disability be the only
factor giving rise to the need for services. However, as
demonstrated by the hearing officer's findings in Capistrano, 99
authorities are willing to make distinctions about the roles that
various qualifying and non-qualifying causes may play in a
student's behavioral and academic problems, without
ultimately tying causation to any single factor.

96. Hensel, supra note 18, at 1164 ("The three categories of impairment which are
most intangible to the casual observer serve most often as the subject of eligibility
disputes: OHI, SLD, and serious emotional disturbance"). OHI, or "other health
impaired," is a classification used in the IDEA to describe a student who exhibits
"limited strength, vitality, or alertness, including a heightened alertness to
environmental stimuli, that results in limited alertness with respect to the educational
environment" due to a chronic illness. See 34 C.F.R. §300.8(c)(9) (2008). Notably,
ADHD qualifies as an "other health impairment." :14 C.F.R. §300.8(c)(9)(i). SLD, or
"specific learning disability" is defined in the federal regulations as "a disorder in one
or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using
language, spoken or written, that may manifest itself in the imperfect ability to listen,
think, speak, read, write, spell, or to do mathematical calculations." 34 C.F.R.
§300.8(c)(10). According to the regulations, a "serious emotional disturbance" is a
condition that results in a student's inability to learn, form interpersonal relationships,
and behave appropriately under normal circumstances. 34 C.F.R. §300.8(c)(4).
97. Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's Responses
to Troubled and Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1338 (2005) ("Although
many disciplinary distinctions remain, it is fair to say that modern scholarship in both
psychology and psychiatry recognizes that the nature and causes of behavioral
problems not only vary from one category to the next, but also from individual to
individual."). See also, Cynthia A. Dietrich & Christine J. Villani, Functional
Behavioral Assessment: Process Without Procedure, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 209, 211
(2000) (stating that "[t]here is no single cause for behavioral problems" and that
identical behavioral problems exhibited by different students are likely to be caused by
different factors).
98. Hensel, supra note 18, at 1154.
99. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
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C. What 's At Stake?
The lack of clarity and uniformity with respect to both the
causes of a student's problems at school, as well as the "by
reason thereof' language, can have serious social consequences,
especially for those students with disabilities that are lesseasily understood. For example, students who are emotionally
disturbed are more likely to drop out of high school a nd to be
arrested within a few years of leaving high school. 10 F ailure to
identify, evaluate, and serve students with these types of
disabilities may represent the loss of the critical last chance to
keep them from entering the juvenile-and ultimately, the
criminal-justice system. 101 While estimates vary, evidence
suggests that a large percentage of incarcerated individuals
suffer from an emotional disturbance, a learning disability, or
both. 102 Moreover, students with emotional disabilities are
"twice as likely as other students with disabilities to be living
in a correctional facility, halfway house, drug treatment center
or 'on the street' after leaving school."I(JJ This problem is
termed by some as the "school-to-prison pipeline," in which
students who fail to receive the services they need at school are
pushed out of the public education system and into the criminal
justice system. 104 The consequences demonstrate just how
critical the need for a clear interpretation of the IDEA
eligibility provisions is.

°

IV. ANALYSIS
Despite Congress's own assertion that equality of
opportunity for individuals with disabilities was an important
national policy driving the reauthorization of the IDEA, 105 the
varying interpretations of the IDEA's eligibility provision do
not further this policy. Equal opportunities for children with
100. Weithorn, supra note 97, at 1358.
101. !d. at 1359.
102. O'Neill, supra note 15, at 1190. See also DISMA:-.JTL!~G THE SCHOOL·TO-PHJSON
PIPELINE, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 6, available at
http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pipeline/Dismantling_the_School_to_Prison_Pipeli
ne.pdf.
103. SPLCenter.org, Southern Poverty Law Center-Legal Action, School-toPrison Pipeline: Stopping the School-to-Prison Pipeline by Enforcing Special Education
Law , http://www.splcenter.org/legal/schoolhouse .jsp. (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
104. See supra notes 101-102.
105. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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disabilities cannot be achieved when students reques ting
special education services from differ ent authorities are held to
different standards. 106 The approaches advocated in this
comment use principles of statutory construction and tort
causation in order to bring the IDEA back in line with its
legislative intent-equal educational opportunities for children
with disabilities.
A. Statutory Construction

When the language of a statute is unambiguous, the words
should be given their ordinary meaning. 107 The plain language
of the IDEA eligibility provisions suggests some sort of a causal
relationship between a student's disability and his need for
services, but the precise nature of this relationship remains
ambiguous, as evidenced by the varying interpretations of the
"by reason thereof" language. 108 This ambiguity should be
resolved by looking at the plain meaning of the words employed
by Congress in the statute, in light of Congress's purpose in
enacting the IDEA. 109
Over 100 years ago, the United States Supreme Court laid
down the enduring principle that, when interpreting statutory
language, courts are obligated to give meaning to every word
and clause of the statute. 110 The approach employed by the

106. See supra Part III.A.
107. See, e.g. , Camine tti v. U .S., 242 U.S. 470, 41-!5 (191 7) (citing La ke County v.
Rollins, 1:30 U.S. 662, 670- 71 (1889); Ba te Refriger a ting Co. v. Sulzhe rger , 157 U.S . I.
:3:3 (189 5); U.S. v. Lexington Mill & Ele vator Co., 2:32 U.S. :-399. 409 (1914) ; U.S. v. First.
Nat'! Bank, 23 4 U.S. 245, 258 (1914)). S ee also , P a rk N' Fl y, Inc. v. Dollar Park a nd
Fly, Inc., 469 U .S . 189, 194 (1985) ("Statutory con s tructi on mu s t begin with the
language employe d by th e Congress a nd the a ssumption th at the ordina ry meanin g of
that la nguage a ccurately expresses the legislative purpose.").
108. See supra Part III.A. See also, supra Part II. B.
109. S ee, U.S . v. Am erican Trucking Ass'n s. , :no U.S . 534, 542 (HJ40); In re
Whita ker Constr. Co. , Inc., 411 F. ad 197, 20 4 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that "' jtjhe
fund a mental question in a ll cases of sta tutory construction is legislative intent and t.hP
reasons that prompted the legislature to enact th e la w."); In re Charter Commc'ns , l nc ..
:393 F. 3d 771, 782 (8th Cir. 2005) (s ta ting that "[tjo the extent that ja s tatute] ... is
fairly seen to be subject to different interpret a tion s, it is ambi guous, and a ny
ambiguity must be resolved by looking to the inte nt of CongreHs in its e nactment of the
legi sla tion.").
110. Montcla ir v. Ram sdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (188:i) ("'ti s the du ty of the court to
give effect, if possible, to every clause a nd word of a statute, a voiding, if it ma y be, a ny
construction whi ch implies that the legislature wa s ignorant of th e nw a ning of the
langu age it employed."). This principl e has been r eaffirm e d in more recent cases. S ee,
e.g , Miller v. U.S., 36:3 F. 3d 999, JOOH (9th Cir. 2004 ) (notin g that "jc jourts mu s t aspire
to give meaning to every word of a legis lative enactme nt .. .. "): Nutrace utical Corp. v.
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, 111 for example, clearly violates that principle.
That court reduced the eligibility inquiry to a two-step process
by stating that once a student demonstrates that he suffers
from a qualifying disability, all he must prove is a need for
special education services. 112 As a matter of statutory
construction, however, the "by reason thereof' language of the
IDEA eligibility provision may not be ignored.
On the other hand, the approach used by the Fifth Circuit
in A.D.'s case also contradicts principles of statutory
construction. 113 The Fifth Circuit concluded that A.D. was not
eligible for special education services under the IDEA because
the court was able to identify factors other than his ADHD that
contributed to his need for services. 114 In other words, the Fifth
Circuit appeared to be interpreting the "by reason thereof'
language to mean "solely by reason thereof." However, the
Supreme Court has proclaimed that a court may not interpret a
statute by adding its own words to it. 115
Congress has stated that one of the driving purposes of the
IDEA is to ensure that all children with disabilities are
provided an equal opportunity to receive an appropriate
education, designed to meet their unique needs. 116 A narrow
reading of the IDEA eligibility provision that excludes those
students whose needs are not caused solely by a qualifying
disability from special education services runs contrary to this
legislative purpose. Instead, courts and other hearing
Von Eshcenbach , 459 F.3d 10:3.'3, 1039 (lOth Cir. 2006) (stating that "this rule embodies
the belief that Congress wo uld not have included superfluous langua ge."); Lowery v.
Ala. Power Co. , 483 F.3d 1184, 1204 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Cooper Indus. , Inc. v.
Aviall Serv. , Inc., 54:3 U.S . 157, 166- 68 (2004); Juggernauth v. U.S. Att'y Gen .. 4:32
F. 3d 1346, 1:354 (llth Cir. 2005).
111. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
112. Bruce C., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 420.
11:3. See supra notes 72--77 and accompanying text.
114. Alvin, 50:3 F.ad al :~ 84.
115. G2 Cases, Etc. v. U.S., :140 U.S. 593, 596 (1951) ("Congress expresses its
purpose by words . lt is for us to ascertain- neither to a dd nor to subtract, neither to
delete nor to di st ort."). This principle has also withstood t he test of time. See, e.g.,
Eubanks v. Wilkinson, 9:37 F.2d 1118, 1125 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[c]ourts
generally do not add words of limita tion to statutes because they are aware of the
dangers of int ruding on t he legislati ve function.") ; Water Quality Ass'n Employees'
Benefit Corp. v. U.S. , 795 F .2d 130 H, 1309 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that ·'court s h ave no
right first to determine the legislative intent of a statute a nd then, under the guise of
interpret ation, proceed to either a dd words to or eliminate other words from the
statute's language.").
116. 20 U.S.C. §1400(d)(l)(A) (2008).
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authorities faced with IDEA eligibility determinations should
be more open to cases of mixed causation, while still requiring
that the qualifying disability play some role in the student's
need for special education services.
In order to determine how much of a role the disability
must play, courts should look to tort law analyses. Tort la w
provides the most comprehensive understanding of the issue of
causation. 11 7 There is no reason to believe . that Congress
desired the IDEA to require a stronger relationship than the
basic cause-in-fact relationship. If it had, Congress would have
included stronger language defining the precise relationship
required by the IDEA. Moreover, principles of causation
derived from tort law have been used in other contexts to
interpret statutory language. 118 Therefore, in IDEA eligibility
cases involving mixed causation, courts should look to
traditional tort analyses of cause-in-fact to determine whether
the student is eligible for special education services.

B. Tort Law Causation as Applied to the IDEA
The Restatement Second of Torts defines cause as conduct
that "is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm." 119
Despite this relatively straight-forward definition, causation is
described as one of the most elusive concepts in all of tort
law. 120 Over time, courts have developed a variety of tests for
causation to address various factual scenarios, but not all of
these analytical frameworks are appropriate for use in the
IDEA eligibility context. For example, while the courts
developed both "cause-in-fact" and "proximate cause" as
causation inquiries, the analysis in this comment focuses solely
on the "cause-in-fact" question. "Proximate cause," which was
developed as a means of limiting liability, has no role to play in
the context of IDEA eligibility determinations, where the
primary inquiry involves what is causing, as a matter of fact,

117. See supra Part IV.B.
118. See, e.g. , Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267- 68 (1992)
(discussing how courts have incorporated principles of proximate causation into their
interpretations of the Sherman Act as well as the civil RICO statute).
119. R ESTATEME NT (SECOND) OF TORTS §431 (1 965).
120. Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (1985)
("[T]he causation requirement has resi sted all efforts to reduce it to a useful,
comprehensive formula and has been the subject of widely divergent views concerning
its nature, conten t, scope, and significance.").
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the student's need for special education services. 12 1
The most common test for cause-in-fact attributes causation
to an act "if and only if, but for the act, the injury would not
have occurred." 122 For example, A runs a red light and hits B . If
A had not run the red light, B would not have suffered the
injury. Now imagine an IDEA eligibility case involving a
student who suffers from ADHD and needs special education
services. No outside contributing factors like drug abuse or
problems at home are identified as possible causes of the
student's need. The court or hearing officer determines that,
without the ADHD, the student would not need services. In
that case, the ADHD would be considered a "but for" cause of
the student's need for special education services because, just
as in the case of A and B, if the alleged cause were removed,
the result would no longer exist. Applying this straightforward
causation analysis, the court or hearing officer could safely
conclude that the IDEA's causation requirement is met because
the student needed services by reason of his ADHD. Therefore,
the student would be considered eligible for special education
services.
However, as seen in A.D.'s case, IDEA-eligibility cases often
pose more complex causation problems. One such situation that
tort law has dealt with is the alternative causation problem,
where only one of two or more independent factors produces
the result, but the plaintiff is unable to determine which one it
is. This problem was famously resolved by the California
Supreme Court in Summers u. Tice. 123 In that case , the
plaintiff suffered injuries to his eye and upper lip when the two
other men whom the plaintiff had been out hunting with shot
in his direction . 124 Although the court determined that only one
of the defendants could have caused the injury, the plaintiff
was unable to identify which one of the defendants had fired
the shot that wounded him. 125 Ultimately, the California
Supreme Court shifted the burden to each of the defendants to
prove that he was not at fault. 126 The Restatement (Second) of
121. See , JOSEPH W. GLANNON, THE LAW OF TORTS: EXAMPLES AN D EXPLANATIONS
130 (3d ed. 2005).
122. Wright, supra note 120, at 1775 ("The most widely used test of actual
causation in tort a djudication is the but-for test.").
123. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
124. Id. at 1- 2.
125. Id. at 2-3.
126. ld. at 5.
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Torts subsequently adopted this approach for use in similar
situations. 127
This approach, however, is not likely to be helpful in IDEA
eligibility cases where a number of factors are at play and it is
unclear how many of them actually contributed to a student's
need for special education services. 128 The burden-shifting
approach used in this type of negligence case is also not
practical in IDEA eligibility cases because the court cannot
literally ask the disability and other factors to prove that they
have not caused the need for special education services.
Although courts could employ the Restatement's approach by
shifting the burden of proving causation to the party
challenging the request for special education services, the
Supreme Court has held that parents hold the burden of
proving violations of the IDEA. 129
Furthermore, the purposes for employing this approach are
different from the purposes of the IDEA. According to the
California Supreme Court in Summers, the burden-shifting
approach is necessary in alternative causation cases in order to
avoid the injustice of requiring the innocent plaintiff to prove
the apportionment of liability for his injury. 130 However, the
IDEA is not concerned with apportioning liability for the
student's n eed for special education services. Instead, the IDEA
recognizes that "[d]isability is a natural part of the human
experience" a nd seeks primarily to improve academic outcomes
for children with disabilities. 131 Therefore, this particular
analytical framework is not applicable to IDEA eligibility
cases.
The concurrent causation analysis, however, a pplies to
cases where multiple factors have acted in concert to produce a
single result. 132 The analysis for concurrent causation hinges
on the sufficiency of the causes. In the case of concurrent
127. See, RP.STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §4:33l3(:'l) (1965).
128. See supra note 96 and accompanyi ng text.
129. Schaffer ex rei. Schaffer v. Weas t, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005). Prior to this
decision , the issue of who had the burden of proof in IDEA cases was ho t ly contested.
For a fu ller di sc ussion of that iss ue, see Charles J . Russo & Allan G. Osborne, ,] r. , The
Supreme Court Clarifies the Burden of Proof in Special Education Dne Process
Hearings: Schaffer ex r ei. Schaffer v. Weast, 208 Eo. L. REP. 705 (2006).
l :lO. Summers, 199 P.2d at 5.
131. 20 U.S. C. §1400(c)(l) (2008).
132. See, e.g. Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704. 705 (Cal. 1989)
(defining "concurrent causation" as a situation in which two separate factors
"simultaneously join together to produce injury. ").
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dependent causes, neither of the factors would have been
sufficient on its own to produce the result. For example,
imagine that a student suffers from an emotional disturbance
and recently began abusing alcohol. A hearing officer
determines that the emotional disturbance on its own would
not have caused the need for services because the student did
not need services before h e began abusing alcohol. The officer
also concludes that the independent effects of the alcohol
abuse-without taking into consideration the effects of the
emotional disturbance-did not cause the need for special
education services. However, now that the two conditions have
combined, the student's behavior and academics are impacted
in such a way that he needs special education services.
In this example, both the emotional disturbance and the
alcoholism would be considered "but for" causes of the student's
need for special education services. If either of those factors
were subtracted from the equation, the need for services would
no longer exist. Therefore, the need must be "but for" each of
the factors. A court or hearing officer presented with this type
of situation should conclude that the student is eligible for
special education services because, although the non-qualifying
condition has played a role in his need for services, the
qualifying disability is a cause-in-fact of his need .
The more difficult, but perhaps more appropriate, analysis
for IDEA eligibility cases involves concurrent independent
causation, in which neither of the factors can be said to be a
"but for" cause of the result. Consider the following example:
two defendants who are unaware of each other negligently
start fires. The fires simultaneously reach and destroy the
plaintiffs house. In that case, neither fire would be a "but for"
cause of the damage because eliminating either from the
equation would not eliminate the result. If Defendant 1 had not
started his fire, the plaintiffs house would nevertheless h ave
been destroyed by the fire set by Defendant 2, and vice
versa. 133 The Restatement (Second) of Torts deals with this
situation by considering both fires to be "substantial factor[s]"
in producing the result. 134 Because the Restatement defines
legal cause as conduct that is a substantial factor in producing

1:3:3. Sec Anderson v. Minm)apolis, 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920) (example deri ve d
from th is ca se).
1:34. S ec RESTATEM ENT (SECOND) OF T ORTS §4:32 (2), illus. :l (1965).
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the result, 135 both defendants would be held liable for the
plaintiffs injury.
In the IDEA eligibility context, consider a case in which a
student is diagnosed with a specific learning disability and has
also suffered years of sexual abuse. The court determines that
even if the student did not have a learning disability, the
effects of the abuse would have been severe enough on their
own to have caused a need for special education services. This
means that the learning disability would not be a "but for"
cause of the need for services because removing it from the
scenario would not eliminate the result. On the other hand, the
court also determines that, had the student not been sexually
abused, the student's learning disability would have
independently caused a need for special education services.
That means that the sexual abuse would not be a "but for"
cause either.
However, a court faced with this problem should employ the
analytical framework used in concurrent independent
causation cases. Both the learning disability and the sexual
abuse should be considered substantial factors in causing the
need for special education services. Therefore, the student
should be considered eligible for special education services.
These analytical frameworks, derived from tort law, provide
courts and other hearing authorities faced with the problem of
mixed causation in IDEA eligibility cases with a clearer basis
for determining whether a student's need for special education
services is "by reason of' his disability. Since principles of
statutory construction require that the "by reason thereof'
language be given its due effect, 136 these tort causation
frameworks provide a way for courts to "show their work" with
respect to that requirement. Although there will almost
certainly be some cases in which the effects of a qualifying
disability are so small that the student should be considered
ineligible, these frameworks provide guidance for determining
eligibility in cases that are too close to call.
V. CONCLUSION

Although a hearing officer had previously concluded that

Jafi.

RESTA'mMENT (SECOND) OFTOR'fS §4 :31.

1:36. 8ee supra Pa rt IV.A.
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A.D. was eligible for special education services, the Fifth
Circuit held that he was ineligible because his need for services
was not by reason of his ADHD. The court, however , did not
explain how it reached that particular result. Other courts and
authorities, believing that the "adversely effects" requirement
incorporates the "by reason thereof' requirement, completely
overlook the "by reason thereof' requirement for IDEA
eligibility, in violation of principles of statutory construction.
These interpretations not only have serious social
consequences, but they also fail to apply the IDEA in
conformity with the purpose Congress intended for the Act,
providing services to students who need them. However, by
following the principles of statutory construction and causation
discussed in this comment, courts and hearing officers can
begin to interpret and apply the IDEA eligibility provision in a
way that enhances the educational experience and provides
adequate and appropriate opportunities for all children with
disabilities.
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